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The Gemini theorem asserts that, given certain reasonable assumptions, no physical 
system can be certainly aware of its own existence.  The theorem can be proved 
algorithmically, but the proof of this theorem is somewhat obscure, and there exists 
very little literature on it.  The purpose of this article is to provide a brief non-
technical summary of the theorem and its proof, with a view to stimulating critical 
discussion of the proof and its implications.  Since the theorem implies that a 
violation of the conservation of energy will take place within the brains of conscious 
human beings, it has obvious implications for any physical theory.
The Basis of the Theorem
The purpose of this article is to provide readers with a simple, non-technical 
explanation of the Gemini theorem.  The theorem, first outlined by Caplain (1995, 
2000)2 and developed by Reason (2016, 2018) establishes that no physical system 
possessing human-level intelligence can ever be certain of possessing conscious 
awareness.   This theorem depends on a small number of well-defined assumptions 
and operationalized definitions, and has no connection with the philosophy of mind.  
Although the theorem refers to the mind-body problem, the proof of the theorem is 
mathematical rather than philosophical, and philosophically minded readers should 
bear in mind that a proof of a mathematical theorem is quite different from an 
argument defending a philosophical thesis. A useful explanation of the difference can 
be found in a paper by Terence Parsons (1996).  
This article is divided into three sections.  The first describes the Gemini theorem 
itself.  The second part analyzes objections which have been made frequently by both 
philosophers and psychologists.  Finally I shall make some concluding remarks about 
the lack of attention which has been given to this type of reasoning over the last fifty 
years.
The proof of the Gemini theorem is extremely simple, and could be scribbled on the 
back of an envelope.  However it is a mathematical proof, not a philosophical 
1Correspondence to:  CMRneuro@gmail.com
2Caplain's first paper has been criticized by Bojadziev (2000) and in a review by Dunlop (2000).  
Caplain's own 2000 paper is a response to these criticisms.
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argument, and therefore lies outside of the comfort zone of most psychologists and 
philosophers of mind.  The basis of the theorem must therefore be explained with 
particular care.  Philosophers who find themselves registering objections at various 
stages of the proof are requested to withhold their objections until they have read the 
subsequent section, since it is likely they will find the answers to their difficulties 
there.
A key feature of the Gemini theorem is that it does not require any assumptions to be 
made about the nature of consciousness itself.  It relies instead on an operational 
property possessed by all healthy conscious human beings.  This is the property of 
being able to assert that they do, in some sense, exist -- a property which I have 
elsewhere referred to as self-certainty (Reason 2016).  This property can be expressed 
as the ability to answer YES to questions such as "Can I be certain that I am 
conscious?" or "Can I be certain that I have at least the illusion that I exist?"  Such an 
ability can be regarded as a specific element of a general set, which comprises the 
ability to answer YES to any question.3  
Now it is clearly the case that, if it can be found that some particular type of system is 
unable to answer YES to any question in the set, then such a system must be incapable
of self-certainty.  Since we are interested in the question of whether human 
consciousness can be wholly physical, we will restrict our considerations to systems 
which have humanlike powers of intelligence and reasoning.  Such a power must, of 
course, include the ability to use both arithmetic and classical logic.  So, if we can 
show that no physical system using arithmetic and classical logic can answer YES to 
any YES/NO question with certainty, then we can show that human consciousness 
cannot be entirely physical.
Following the definition given in Reason (2018), let us explicate that a physical 
system is any system entirely made up of, or supervening on, a set of objectively real 
properties, such that the system has the capability to evolve in time.   This assumption
we shall call the principle of physicalism.  
It is obviously the case that in such a physical system, any function -- such as the 
function of finding the answer to some YES/NO question -- will supervene on some 
physical process.  Of course, physical processes will differ in their ability to perform 
such a function.  Some will do so correctly, others incorrectly or not at all.  We shall 
express this notion as the axiom of fallibility -- for any given function, any given 
process may perform that function either correctly or incorrectly.  In order to know 
which, one has to determine something about the process.
Here we note that the function of finding out whether some process is correct, can 
itself be represented as answering a YES/NO question -- such as "Does this process 
perform this function correctly".  From the principle of physicalism, this function 
must be performed ultimately by some physical process -- which will itself be subject 
to the axiom of fallibility.
We can express this situation in terms of a couplet of sentences:
3If these questions are assumed to be expressed in the English language, then the set of such questions 
is of course recursively enumerable.
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The function of answering a YES/NO question must, by the principle of physicalism, 
be performed by some physical process.
The correctness of any physical process must, by the axiom of fallibility, be 
established by answering some new YES/NO question.
This is the Gemini Couplet, and quite clearly it induces a non-terminating sequence of
processes -- which is to say, an infinite regress.  It is therefore obvious that, for any 
physical system capable of reasoning in classical logic with arithmetic, no YES/NO 
question can be answered with certainty.  Since the set of YES/NO questions includes 
self-certainty, it is obvious that any physical system capable of reasoning using 
classical logic with arithmetic induction is incapable of self-certainty.  We can 
therefore express the Gemini theorem as follows:
"No physical system capable of humanlike reasoning can decide any YES/NO 
question with absolute certainty in a finite number of steps."
This is the "back-of-an-envelope" version of the proof -- the formal proof given in 
Reason (2018) is much longer, but amounts to the same thing.  However the proof can
also be expressed as an effective procedure in terms of the following certainty 
lemma4. Here we assume that M is some physical system capable of humanlike 
reasoning (including the ability to use arithmetic and classical logic):
We start by assuming that M is certain of some proposition p, which can be 
represented as the answer to some YES/NO question.  By the principle of 
physicalism, the process of determining p must supervene on some physical process, 
say X.  From the axiom of fallibility, M can deduce that X may be fallible.  Since M 
can reason using classical logic, M can deduce that if X is fallible, then its answer to 
the YES/NO question corresponding to p may be incorrect, in which case M cannot be
certain of p.  Therefore to be certain of p, M must have some way of determining that 
X is operating correctly.  By the principle of physicalism, this must supervene on 
some physical process, say X*.  But what process is X*?   It cannot be X, since M 
relies on the process X* to ensure that X is operating correctly.  X therefore depends 
on X*, not the other way round.
Therefore M must assume that X* is some new process X', which is different from X. 
But from the axiom of fallibility, M can deduce that X' may be fallible.  Since M's 
certainty of p depends on X, and the correctness of X depends on X', M must have 
some means of determining that X' is operating correctly.  Let us call this process 
X**.  But what process is X**?  It cannot be X', since the correctness of X' depends 
on the correctness of X**.  Neither can it be X, since establishing the correctness of X
requires the correctness of X'.  Therefore we require some new process X'' ... and so 
on ad infinitum.  This leaves us with no choice but to discard the assumption which 
led to the regress -- that is, the assumption that M can be certain of p.
The purpose of this lemma is to illustrate that it is unnecessary to make assumptions 
about the nature of certainty in order to prove the Gemini theorem.  The assumption 
4This is a slightly modified version of the certainty lemma from Reason (2018).
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that certainty in a physical system is possible is in itself sufficient to generate an 
infinite regress in any humanlike physical system using both arithmetic and classical 
logic.  The certainty lemma can be regarded as an algorithm which takes as its input 
some YES/NO question, and decides whether or not that question can be answered in 
a finite number of steps with certainty .  For any physical system capable of 
humanlike reasoning, the algorithm will always return the answer that no YES/NO 
question can be answered in this way5.  Because the proof of the Gemini theorem can 
be expressed algorithmically in this way, it cannot be regarded as a philosophical 
argument but must be understood as a mathematical proof.
Objections which have been raised against the Gemini theorem and its 
implications
This list includes all the objections which I have received to date.  Some of these are 
covered in more detail in my previous paper (Reason 2018); others are listed here for 
the first time.  They are collected here together for simplicity and convenience.  All 
are based on fairly straightforward misunderstandings of the theorem, its proof, and 
its application.
The requirement for proving an infinite sequence of propositions is not a necessary 
epistemological assumption.
This is correct, but the requirement for such an infinite sequence does not follow from
any epistemological assumptions about the nature of certainty.  It follows simply from
three assumptions:  Firstly, that any humanlike physical system must be capable of 
humanlike reasoning;  secondly, the principle of physicalism; and thirdly, the axiom 
of fallibility.  Any physical system capable of humanlike reasoning can prove that its 
certainty depends on being able to prove an infinite sequence of propositions; it is not 
necessary to assume this, and this is shown in the above certainty lemma.  In any 
system capable of humanlike reasoning, the Gemini couplet is itself sufficient to 
generate such an infinite sequence.
M can be certain of some proposition because it has access to additional evidence 
which is not available in the possible world where the physical process X fails.
This is incorrect, and is based on a failure to appreciate that the Gemini proof applies 
to all YES/NO questions.  This includes questions of the form "Does this additional 
evidence exist?".  Any means used by M to determine the existence of this additional 
evidence, must by the principle of physicalism supervene on some physical process.  
This process can be regarded as performing the function of answering a question of 
the form "Does this evidence exist?"  Clearly, the Gemini theorem will apply to any 
5
Strictly one might argue that the certainty lemma is not really a lemma, since it is really just the 
Gemini theorem proved by another means.   However to ensure that the Gemini theorem covers self-
referential statements, it is necessary to prove an additional Cartesian lemma, which is described later 
in this article.  The certainty lemma and the Cartesian lemma together can be taken as providing a 
comprehensive proof of the Gemini theorem.
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such process.
It is quite possible to program a machine to respond "yes" to the question "Am I 
conscious?" without having any idea what it is doing.
Once again this is correct, but it does not provide a way round the Gemini theorem.  
Since it is required that any humanlike physical system must be capable of humanlike 
reasoning, such a system can itself deduce that such a program may exist.   Needless 
to say, the axiom of fallibility will apply to any such program, and this the system will
also be able to deduce.    The Gemini couplet therefore applies as before.6
Since the definition of self-certainty is completely operationalized, there is no basis 
for interpreting statements such as "I exist" as being either true or false.
The physical systems covered by the Gemini theorem are required to be capable of 
humanlike reasoning, which means they must be capable of treating the answers to all 
YES/NO questions as statements which can be either true or false.   The inability of 
such a physical system to perform the operation of self-certainty then follows 
naturally; it is not necessary that the operation itself be interpreted in any way by any 
external observer.
This is just equivalent to saying that any physical system covered by the Gemini 
theorem, must be capable of reasoning according to some logical system which 
supports an interpretation in terms of truth values.  This is a necessary precondition 
for any system to reason according to the principles of classical logic.  Since the 
Gemini theorem covers all YES/NO questions, there is no need to consider the 
meanings of the individual YES/NO questions themselves.
There is no theoretical reason why even human beings should actually be capable of 
self-certainty.
This response comes most often from psychologists and cognitive scientists, and is 
absolutely correct.  The ability of human beings to perform self-certainty is an 
empirical matter -- it cannot be established by any sort of theoretical argument.  This 
observation invites two responses.  The quick response is that if self-certainty is 
possible in humans, then this entails a clear empirical prediction, which is the c effect 
described in my previous papers.  Since this prediction can in principle be tested, no 
further theoretical discussion of this point is strictly necessary.
The more detailed response, however, is that it is not clear to me that all of those who 
claim that self-certainty is not possible in human beings have really thought all that 
much about what they are committing themselves to.  It is fairly easy to argue that 
human beings cannot be certain that they have conscious existence if one has 
6More specifically, the axiom of fallibility will apply to any process which correlates a state of the 
system with the truth-value of some proposition.
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implicitly in mind some particular theoretical or philosophical notion of what 
consciousness is.  But the implication of the Gemini theorem is that self-certainty is 
impossible in any physical system regardless of what consciousness is assumed or 
understood to be.  It is impossible, according to the Gemini theorem, for a physical 
system to be certain even that it possesses the illusion of consciousness.  Indeed it 
would be impossible for a physical system to be certain of its own existence in any 
sense.  Those who claim that self-certainty is impossible in human beings are 
therefore committing themselves to the notion that they cannot even be sure they have
any form of existence whatsoever.  They cannot even be certain that they are not dead 
(in the sense of being completely non-existent, as opposed to preserved in some sort 
of virtual reality afterlife).  Those who make this claim should therefore be quite 
explicit that they do, indeed, intend this commitment.
The theorem relies in a two-valued logic, and may not work for a multivalued logic.
This is not entirely correct.  By expressing propositions in terms of certain versus 
uncertain, one can actually transform all the required propositions into YES/NO 
questions -- that is, answers to questions of the form "Can I be certain of some 
proposition p?"  Only if one is prepared to endorse logical systems in which 
propositions can be both certain and uncertain, or neither certain nor uncertain, can 
the Gemini theorem be avoided.  It is not clear, at least to this author, what sort of 
meaningful interpretation such a logic could support.
The proof only applies if one assumes a foundationalist epistemology
This is primarily a criticism of Caplain's original papers, which were expressed in 
fairly traditional philosophical language and were therefore vulnerable to a 
considerable amount of equivocation over terms.  The criticism itself results from a 
simple misunderstanding of the theorem.  The theorem itself does not assume or 
imply that self-certainty, or indeed any other kind of certainty, is possible in human 
beings.  The possibility of self-certainty in human beings can only be established 
empirically, and it applies only to a specific limited class of propositions -- those that 
relate to consciousness or existence.
Human beings do not need to "prove" that they are conscious or that they exist -- the 
fact that they are capable of asking the question "Am I conscious" already establishes
that.
We must not assume a priori that physical systems, or machines, possess some 
competency just because we ourselves are aware of possessing it.  The objection here 
is evidently a version of the Cartesian "I think therefore I am" and is subject to the 
following lemma, adapted from Reason (2018):
A system reasoning using classical logic could get as far as asking "Do I exist?" and 
then argue, along the lines of Descartes' Cogito ergo sum, that it does not really 
matter if the physical process which subserves the answering of that question is 
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accurate or not -- the mere fact that such a physical process exists is enough to 
answer the question in the affirmative.  One can express this in the form of a 
Cartesian Principle: If M is asking "Do I exist?" then M must exist.  
Descartes' Cogito can thus be represented as a deduction of the form:
If M is asking "Do I exist?" then M exists;
M is asking "Do I exist?";
Therefore M exists.
However this syllogism requires M to establish that it is the case that M is asking "Do
I exist?".  Since this clearly entails answering a YES/NO question, the Gemini proof 
will apply to it, as before.
The same physical state may represent both the answer to some question and the 
question itself, so it is impossible even in principle for that answer to be wrong.
This is essentially the philosophical theory known as constitutivism (see for example 
Shoemaker, 1990).  In the context of the Gemini theorem it implies that, for example, 
the same physical state represents both the state of consciousness itself, and the 
answer YES to the question "Can I be certain that I am conscious?".  Alternatively, 
both the state of consciousness and the answer YES to the such a question both result 
from the same physical process.  According to the theory, therefore, it is not possible 
for a system to be in a state of having the answer YES to the question "Can I be 
certain that I am conscious?" unless it is, in fact, conscious.
However, as an escape route from the Gemini theorem, this simply will not work.  To 
see why, we can express the constitutivist's reasoning as follows:
1  If a system of type M has property A, then it must also have property B;
2  A system M1 of type M has property A;
3  Therefore M1 has property B.
Clearly 2 can be expressed as the answer to a YES/NO question.  Applying the 
Gemini couplet to this question must therefore generate an infinite regress.  
Constitutivism therefore offers no escape from the Gemini theorem.
There is no obvious reason why the axiom of fallibility should be accepted.
It is useful to assume the axiom of fallibility in order to express the Gemini proof as a 
simple couplet.  But as was demonstrated in Reason (2018), the axiom of fallibility is 
not strictly necessary to prove the theorem.  For any given YES/NO question, there 
will always be at least one physical process which will answer that question 
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incorrectly7.  One can therefore ask the question Q:
"Can I be certain that some physical process X answers some given question 
correctly?"
Since Q is clearly a YES/NO question, it must by the principle of physicalism be 
answered by some physical process, say X'.  One can then ask the question Q':
"Can I be certain that the physical process X' answers question Q correctly?"
Since Q' is clearly a YES/NO question, it must by the principle of physicalism be 
answered by some physical process, say X''.  One can then ask the question Q'':
"Can I be certain that the physical process X'' answers the question Q' correctly?"
Once again this clearly induces an infinite regress.
There is no reason in principle why a single physical process should not perform an 
infinite number of functions simultaneously.
Both the detailed proof and the certainty lemma do indeed implicitly assume that 
every function is performed by a separate process.   It may indeed seem reasonable, 
on the face of things, that allowing a single process to perform an infinite set of 
functions would rescue one from the consequences of the Gemini theorem.  
Unfortunately this is not the case.  One could simply ask the question:
"Can I be certain, that it is not the case that every single function in the infinite set has
been performed incorrectly?"
Such a question leads us once again into an infinite regress.
The definition of a physical system is so general that it encompasses every 
conceivable type of system.  There can therefore be no system to which the Gemini 
theorem does not apply.
This is simply incorrect.  The easiest way of seeing this is in terms of the certainty 
lemma above.  Note that in the certainty lemma, the principle of physicalism is used 
to infer the existence of some process X, to which the axiom of fallibility is then 
applied.  However if the principle of physicalism is not assumed, then no process X 
can be inferred.  There is therefore no process to which the axiom of fallibility can be 
applied, and the certainty lemma does not apply.
The Gemini theorem cannot be applied to statements about consciousness because the
theorem tells us nothing about the nature of consciousness itself.
7As was pointed out in Reason (2018), such a process can always be constructed by applying a logical 
NOT operator to the function which any given question.
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Although the Gemini theorem explicitly requires us to make no assumptions at all 
about the nature of consciousness, people persist in raising this as an objection.  The 
Gemini theorem establishes only that there is an inconsistency between self-certainty 
and the properties of certain types of physical system (those which are capable of 
humanlike reasoning).  It is not intended, and is not required, to establish anything 
else about consciousness.  This type of objection seems to illustrate most clearly the 
difference between a mathematical proof and a philosophical argument, and the 
apparent reluctance of many philosophers of mind to appreciate the difference.  
The assumptions on which the proof depends are ill-defined or incorrect.
The Gemini proof depends on three key assumptions:  Firstly, that M is capable of 
humanlike reasoning; secondly, the principle of physicalism;  thirdly the axiom of 
fallibility.  As was shown above, one can even dispense with the axiom of fallibility if 
one really wishes to do so.  No correspondent has yet stated which of these 
assumptions is supposed to be unclear or incorrect.
The proof is too simple and obvious to be correct.  If the theorem were correct then it 
would already be well-known.
This is undoubtedly my favorite of all the objections I have received to date.  I suspect
that the theorem may well have been discovered already on many occasions, but the 
discoverers concluded that the proof was far too simple and obvious to be correct, and
that if correct it would already be well-known.  They therefore neglected to publish 
their results.
Discussion
As we have seen, the proof of the Gemini theorem is extremely simple.  Indeed I can 
see no reason why it should not have been discovered and proved by anyone at any 
time in the last sixty years.  Yet I can find no reference to the theorem, or to any 
argument equivalent to it, anywhere in the philosophical literature at any time prior to 
Caplain's publication in 1995.  This seems extraordinary.  How can one account for 
such an omission?
Part of the answer may lie in the nature of philosophical argument itself.  As Parsons 
(1996) has pointed out, philosophical arguments are constructed quite differently from
mathematical or logical proofs.  A proof is a statement derived from an explicit set of 
well-defined assumptions by means of clear rules of inference.  An argument, by 
contrast, is a rationalization constructed to defend a pre-existing thesis, and is usually 
expressed in language which is intrinsically equivocal.  Most, if not all, of the 
objections raised against the Gemini theorem in the preceding section can be 
attributed to misconceptions arising from the failure to appreciate the difference 
between a mathematical proof and a philosophical argument.
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Considered as a mathematical proof, there are three ways one could attempt to 
challenge the basis of the Gemini proof.  One could argue that certain of the 
assumptions on which it depends are untrue.  Alternatively one could argue that it 
depends on implicit assumptions which are not explicitly stated.  Or finally one could 
argue that the rules of inference are not correctly applied in the derivation.
None of the objections raised against the Gemini proof to date have adopted any of 
these approaches.  Instead, all objections to date have fallen into one of three classes.  
Firstly, there are objections which simply fail to take account of all the assumptions 
and conditions laid out in Reason (2018).  Secondly, there are objections which 
attempt to equivocate over the meanings of terms without regard to the logical 
relationships between them.  And thirdly, there are objections which just ignore the 
proof entirely and simply express disapproval of its conclusion.  (Since objections of 
this last type are not properly arguments at all, they are not included in the above list.)
Some correspondents have claimed a potential similarity between the Gemini theorem
and the Lucas-Penrose argument which uses Godel's theorem to imply an intrinsic 
difference between the properties of machines and the capabilities of human minds.  I 
believe this similarity is more apparent than real.  Whereas the Lucas-Penrose thesis 
concentrates on a supposed difference between minds and machines, or between 
minds and formal systems, the Gemini theorem is actually concerned with the 
difference between machines or physical systems on the one hand, and the abstract 
logical systems they supposedly instantiate on the other  (Indeed the "nature" of mind 
plays no part in the Gemini proof, since the concept of mind is fully operationalized 
from the outset.)  It is this difference which is formalized as the axiom of fallibility.  A
physical system may be a perfect instantiation of some formal system, but that does 
not mean it can be certain of that fact.  When one is dealing with actual physical 
entities, as opposed to abstract systems, then the issue of epistemic possibility arises.  
A proposition that cannot be true in any possible world may nonetheless appear to be 
possible from the viewpoint of some observer with imperfect knowledge.  For 
example, one could argue that there is no possible world in which Fermat's last 
theorem is untrue.   But a typical mathematician of the nineteenth century could not 
have been certain of this; for such a person, it would have been epistemically possible 
for Fermat's last theorem to be false.  Similarly, propositions which are ontologically 
impossible in a formal system may nonetheless be epistemically possible to a physical
instantiation of that system.  This is the point upon which the Gemini theorem hinges. 
The upshot is that the Gemini theorem does not depend on any assumptions about 
Godel's Incompleteness theorems.  Nonetheless, if the Gemini theorem is correct, and 
it is also the case that human beings are capable of self-certainty, then it is difficult to 
avoid the conclusion that the Lucas-Penrose thesis must also be correct.  In that sense 
the Gemini theorem, together with the empirical finding of self-certainty in humans, 
can be regarded as an independent confirmation of the thesis.
It is regrettable that none of those who have so far raised objections to the Gemini 
theorem have been prepared to submit their objections to peer-reviewed publication.  
This article is, in large part, an attempt to stimulate just such a discussion in the peer-
reviewed literature, which is surely where it should be taking place.  There is no doubt
that the consequences of the Gemini theorem will be deeply unattractive to many, if 
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not most, cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind.  A temptation obviously 
exists for such individuals to rationalize their dislike of these consequences in terms 
of spurious and poorly argued objections which are never submitted to peer-reviewed 
publication.  I therefore recommend all philosophers and cognitive scientists who 
have such objections to submit them for publication, so that they can be subjected to 
proper peer review and analysis.
In my work so far I have implicitly taken it for granted that human beings are capable 
of certainty.  One may choose to question this assumption; it is however empirically 
testable. If self-certainty is indeed possible in human beings, then the Gemini theorem
predicts that a violation of energy conservation (or c effect) should in principle be 
detectable in human brains.  Such a violation clearly has implications for any physical
theory.  Furthermore the Gemini theorem explicitly requires that such a violation 
cannot, even in principle, have a physical explanation.  On the face of things this 
might seem to be bad news for physicists.  However, I do not think that things are 
actually quite so bad.  In fact, c has some helpful properties.  Firstly, even if we 
cannot say how it works, we can say exactly what it does.  We can also say exactly 
when it will do it.  In this respect, it resembles Turing's notion of an oracle, and can be
treated in a similar way.
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